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Abstract 
 
This paper has two authors, two titles and is written in the form of a dialogue, 
rather than conveying a unitary voice, as one would instead expect of a co-
authored paper. The reason for this is that the articulation of the authors' 
disagreement, despite the identification of each of them with “the left”, is 
precisely the object of inquiry. After briefly introducing the problem on which 
the authors’ discussion takes place, namely regime collisions, and the clash of 
approaches that are available to (decide whether to) deal with them, a 
dialogue follows, in which the authors’ voices are clearly separated as they 
discuss the specific issue of the measurement of quality as a (managerialist) 
proposal to “solve” regime collisions, and contrast that to more openly 
politicised views of approaching regime collisions. In the end, the main 
features of such discussion are examined in such a way as to bring forth the 
peculiar self-consciousness that pluralist spaces give rise to, weakening and 
downsizing every point of view that appoints itself as the “higher” vantage 
point from which to describe the world and enumerate problems, and 
stimulating a constant oscillation between perspectives. This commitment to a 
pluralistic confrontation and the ensuing hybridization of perspectives is, we 
argue, at the heart of the idea of “the left” which we both identify with. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper1 has two authors, two titles and is written in the form of a dialogue, 
rather than conveying a unitary voice, as one would instead expect of a co-
authored paper. The reason for this is that the articulation of the authors' 
disagreement, despite the identification of each of them with “the left”, is 
precisely the object of our inquiry. Our shared assertion of a common 
belonging, in the face of a marked divergence in our positions (one of us 
being a radical ecologist, the other a Calabresi-style2 progressive), has 
challenged us to subvert the common structure of academic discourse in 
order to accommodate dissent, as well as the non-linearity of personal 
conversation, as it unfolded in the wiki which we have used to co-write this 
work. 
 
The hybridization of academic discourse with a sprinkle of narrative has 
therefore freed us from the temptation to identify the idea of “the left”, and 
what it means to belong to it, with a particular intellectual position, and instead 
allowed us to elaborate a common structure within which to voice our different 
views. The presence of spaces enabling the hybridization of narratives and 
discourses, allowing each to become aware of its boundaries and limitations, 
is – we submit – at the heart of the leftist project, and what gives this work the 
peculiar quality of marrying both our strategy and our tactics,3 as it 
implements exactly the type of hybridization experiment it eventually supports. 
This marriage between strategy and tactics, however, blurs into the absence 
of such distinction the moment we practice nothing less than what we preach, 
and preach nothing more than what we practice, eliminating the temporal 
hiatus between a practical dimension centered in the present and a future 
normativity. 
 
Realizing that spaces of discussion and contestation are not purely procedural 
tactics in view of a monolithic strategy, but themselves a strategy that is 
susceptible of immediate implementation, has, we believe, a profoundly 
empowering effect, in that it turns what is often deemed a weakness of the left 
(its lack of a unitary voice) into its principal contribution. To use an aesthetic 
allusion, this is tantamount to reclaiming – in the playful celebration of a 
renewed ability to appreciate the ubiquity of colourful diversity: “¡Toda joia, 
toda beleza!” (Roy Paci & Aretuska, 2007) – what has all too often been 
regarded as something “que rambla perdida” [that wanders lost] (Roy Paci & 
Aretuska, 2007), namely the proposal of “an alternative mode of relating” (De 
Angelis, 2004, 591) in addressing divergent standpoints. 
                                            
1
 Both authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for the feedback provided on a previous version of this work, 
to Saki Bailey for introducing them to collaborative writing, to Gunther Teubner, Luca Pes, Fabian Muniesa and Talha 
Syed for their inspiration and to John D. Haskell, Giuseppe Mastruzzo, Rodrigo Miguez and Ugo Mattei for their 
support throughout. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2
 See, e.g., Calabresi (2011). 
3
 On the distinction between strategy and tactics, see Knox (2011). 
 
As the discussion that we have carried out in the following sections shows, 
however, negotiating boundaries and hybridizing languages is not as easy as 
it may at first seem, at least if one takes seriously Lacan's (and Žižek's) 
assertion that – in language – someone always has the upper hand, as 
language is more of an imposition than a co-creation, so that the opening of 
spaces for discussion and contestation is not so much a static achievement, a 
releasement of tensions in an oasis of “egalitarian intersubjectivity” (Žižek, 
2008, 61-62), but a process that requires constant renegotiation: a reiterated 
turning of the table to escape from the corner a particular choice of language 
might relegate (meaningful) problems to, lest falling prey to a merely 
superficial celebration of: 
 
[T]he diversity of participants, but only to the extent that they 
are brought together through a process that is defined in a 
particular manner – vertical – and that is ordered by a certain 
discourse. (De Angelis, 2004, 593)  
 
This being said, the following Section briefly introduces the problem on which 
the discussion in Section 2 is later centred, namely regime collisions, and the 
different approaches that are available to (decide whether to) deal with them. 
As anticipated, Section 2 is then structured as a dialogue, in which our voices 
are clearly separated as we discuss the specific issue of the measurement of 
quality as a (managerialist) proposal to “solve” regime collisions, and contrast 
that to more openly politicised views of approaching regime collisions. In the 
conclusion, the main features of the discussion carried out in Section 2 are 
then examined in such a way as to bring forth the peculiar self-consciousness 
that pluralist spaces give rise to, weakening and downsizing every point of 
view that appoints itself as the “higher” vantage point from which to describe 
the world and enumerate problems, and stimulating the constant oscillation 
between perspectives that has been aptly described by Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (2010, 13-29). 
I. REGIME COLLISIONS: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 
Talk of “regimes” in international law – understood as complexes of principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making processes around which expectations 
converge - is the outgrowth of “regime theory”,  an approach to the study of 
international rules and rule-making that attempts to make sense of the 
growing complexity of the international sphere, through the springing up of 
new actors beyond nation states, thereby making law no longer a matter inter-
nationes, but a veritable trans-national process involving all sorts of different 
actors, even down to individuals (Brown & Ainsley, 2005, 129-133; Koh, 1997, 
2624). Within this broader discourse, the methodological stance that is 
adopted in approaching the problem of regime collisions in this paper is 
Luhmann’s (and Teubner’s) theory of functional differentiation, due to its 
ability to single out different “autopoietic” regimes – thereby making room for 
regime heterogeneity -, and then trace out their inter-relations – and 
hybridizations - in a web comprising core-nodes, selective openings and in-
between spaces.4 It is precisely in the light of this starting assumption of 
“operative closure” of different regimes - affording an easier inroad into the 
understanding of “selective openings” - that we have preferred this framework 
over others, like transnational legal process (Koh, 1997, 2645 ff.), that – while 
similar in substance – appear less suited for the type of analysis this paper 
aimed at (though more suited for other explanatory purposes; see, e.g., Koh , 
1997, 2649-55). 
 The presence of multiple transnational regimes, understood as “complexes of 
norms and institutions” (Koskenniemi, forthcoming, 1) comes bundled with the 
possibility of multi-dimensional clashes between the different rationalities 
informing each of these specialised regimes. So, for instance, conflicts 
between trade and health, trade and development, trade and environmental 
protection, trade and human rights5 are the stock-in-trade of the 
contemporary presence of multiple conflicting global regimes. These conflicts 
don't only occur at an abstract level. Throughout the twentieth century and 
more intensely in the last decades, there has been a multiplication of 
transnational institutions with rule-making faculties, which constitute and 
update their own legal framework. In many cases, they are also endowed with 
dispute settlement bodies that allow stakeholders to bring claims related to 
their area of expertise. However, in contrast to what happens at the nation-
state level, the stakeholder’s role is less prominent in the process of rule-
making, so there is little room for the balancing of interests. 
 
As a result, conflicts of jurisdiction and incompatibilities between rules are 
commonplace in the transnational sphere, which cannot be settled through 
the same methods nation-states use when such problems take place before 
their domestic courts. Given the specificity of the international order by virtue 
of its lack of an overarching binding authority and a clear-cut and fairly 
uncontroversial hierarchy of norms and judicial authorities, as well as the 
more or less narrow sectoral focus of the policies pursued by different 
international organizations, these conflicts of norms and jurisdictions require a 
more creative approach that goes beyond the traditional reasoning a nation-
state-centred approach to legal hierarchies would mandate (Fischer-Lescano 
& Teubner, 2004, 1007-08). In fact, the decision to tackle a case as one 
belonging to a specific functional regime (and not another, e.g. as a problem 
of trade and not environmental protection or human rights) has to be 
                                            
4 In this respect, although the sociological take of functional differentiation comes with its own language and 
framework of analysis, it is submitted that the Teubnerian understanding of functional systems as network-like 
structures (see Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2004, 1017-18) does not make the present discussion on hybridization 
between different regimes (which Luhmann already understood as separate realities that enact themselves 
autopoietically) inaccessible from other standpoints, such as John Law’s concept of assemblage, which he already 
borrows from Deleuze (see Law, 2004, 41-42). In particular, the following view of assemblage appears eminently 
compatible with the process of hybridization which we describe later: 
[A]ssemblage is a process of bundling, of assembling, or better of recursive self-assembling in 
which the elements put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list 
but are constructed at least in part as they are entangled together (Law, 2004, 42, emphasis 
added). 
An in-depth discussion of the possible points of contact between the two approaches, however, surely deserves more 
than a footnote, and lays beyond the scope of this paper. 
5
 The debate between Petersmann (2002) and Alston (2002) offers an interesting take on this.  
undertaken in a de-centralized fashion by national courts and transnational 
instances of conflict resolution that act without previous consultation. Most 
importantly, the sectoral specificity of the different sets of rules and institutions 
that one finds at the global level, where the non-subject-specificity of state 
jurisdiction is splintered in specialised functional regimes (Fischer-Lescano & 
Teubner, 2004, 1008-09), causes regime collisions at the transnational level 
to acquire the dimension of veritable conflicts between rationalities (e.g. 
science vs. technology vs. environment) rather than conflicts between the 
policies of organizations and nation-states, requiring that a degree of 
compatibility be established among said rationalities: 
 
[T]he fragmentation of law is the epiphenomenon of real-world 
constitutional conflicts, as legal fragmentation is – mediated via 
autonomous legal regimes – a legal reproduction of collisions 
between the diverse rationalities within global society (Fischer-
Lescano & Teubner, 2004, 1017) 
 
That such collisions ought to be a problem, however, is – as this paper aims 
to show – itself open to debate. Indeed, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004, 
1003) warn against the risk of problematizing regime collisions all too soon, as 
this may lead to an excessively swift reduction of collisions to a “technical” 
legal or economic issue, or to their equally one-dimensional politicization. 
Nowhere are these two extremes better elucidated than in Martti 
Koskenniemi's forthcoming chapter (Koskenniemi, forthcoming), where he 
reviews a series of attempts that purport to provide a “neutral” solution to 
regime collisions, and then contrasts the managerial posture embedded in 
such attempts with a different reading of regime collisions based on the 
concept of hegemony. Koskenniemi eventually concludes that there is no 
“value free” way to resolve such conflicts, and that these ought actually to be 
translated in open political terms in order to avoid cluttering the debate with 
the misguided assumption of value neutrality that underpins managerial 
discourse, which has the ultimate effect of making hegemony become 
invisible, but no less present (Koskenniemi, forthcoming, 17). 
 
The “constitutional” delimitation of the reciprocal relationship between 
conflicting regimes is often not a product of a peaceful re-entry sought by an 
influential managerial expert; rather, the constitutional moment comes, more 
frequently than not, after a social catastrophe or near-catastrophe caused by 
the expansionist tendencies of a specialized cognitive field (Teubner, 2011, 
9). It is the task of legal pluralism, therefore, to raise awareness of the 
dangers involved in framing issues as the “competence” of a single field of 
knowledge, and by extension, of experts that have been trained to see the 
world through a unidimensional lens and attach value to a very narrow set of 
consequences. In the face of the growing phenomenon of functional 
differentiation in the transnational layer of world society, Koskenniemi 
therefore seems to suggest that the self-understanding of specialized 
functional regimes should shift to take into account the political aspect of 
managerial pseudo-neutral decision-making. 
 
These two narratives, the “technically neutral” (which Koskenniemi criticises) 
and the “openly political” one (which he prefers), we seek to play out in the 
following Section, where we look at a peculiar managerialist way of 
addressing regime collisions by introducing a “calculus of quality” to enable 
some sort of cost-benefit analysis to guide decision making. In the conclusion, 
we look at what the dialectical dance between the different approaches 
considered there tells us about regime collisions, and at whether that very 
dance tells us something more interesting about regime collisions that goes 
beyond any of the “entrenched” perspectives – i.e. “technicalization” and 
“complete politicization” – which we will be discussing below. 
II. QUALITY AS LINGUA FRANCA FOR ARTICULATING 
REGIME COLLISIONS: A DEBATE 
In relation to regime collisions, Doria (2009) describes the possibility for 
discourse about “quality” to act as an enabling device, i.e. as a “code for 
connecting and integrating different actors and spheres of action” (Doria, 
2009, 144 & 160-61). This property is – for Doria – inherent in the 
indeterminacy of such discourse (Doria, 2009, 161), which allows it to 
accommodate and contrast different sector-specific variations (e.g. 
environmental quality, commercial quality, regulatory quality), thereby acting 
as a kind of lingua franca for the purpose of regime collisions (Doria, 2009, 
161). Of course, this (theoretical) neutrality of quality casts the separate 
problem of retaining its contestability in (the practice of) quality discourse and 
appraisal, so as to avoid the latter's capture by a specific rationality: this 
seems clear when Doria concedes that, on the one hand, “the technologies of 
quality [appraisal] appear to display a tendency to reduce the political space 
and to produce a particular form of de-politicization” (Doria, 2009, 163), while 
simultaneously being “constitutively open to contestation processes, which 
may engender new networks and coalitions.” (Doria, 2009, 163) 
To restate the point, quality discourse appears to be especially amenable to 
accomodate the co-existence of separate realms of the social. However, its 
function to act as a bridge between different communicative worlds, positing 
itself as a lingua franca to enable the reciprocal acknowledgment of different 
rationalities, is underpinned by an underlying idea of all-comparability of the 
social. “Quality” and the discourse centred around its appraisal (what Callon 
and Law (2003) call “qualculation”)6 seem, in other words, to answer to a 
peculiar imperative revolving around the mobilisation of all of life towards 
performance (Doria, 2011) by making it available through language. (Doria, 
2009, 166-67) 
 
Which leads to the question from which the following debate sets off. Namely, 
whether the assumption of all-communicability underpinning quality discourse 
(as a tool to facilitate regime collisions) does not, in and of itself, fail the test 
for “neutrality” or “indeterminacy” on which Doria appears – instead – to justify 
the refusal of “a merely oppositional attitude towards contemporary quality 
discourse” (Doria, 2009, 165), urging to “distance oneself from the position 
that traces the problematic character of the matter [of the “calculative” 
                                            
6
 On calculative practices, see also Callon and Muniesa (2005). 
practices around quality] to the risk of a technocratic degeneration of quality 
management”.(Doria, 2009, 165)  
 
[LR] Indeed, it is submitted it does fail such test, and is actually “over-
determinate” to such an extent that it is inseparable from a social engineering 
posture and the managerialist approach to regime collisions that is poised on 
the former. The story, it will be attempted to show, is not that quality is 
theoretically neutral, and only exposed to capture by a particular functional 
rationality as a matter of practice. Instead, quality, and the practices of 
“qualculation”, are all based on a precise value-judgment that sees – to quote 
Doria – the “mobilisation of life towards performance” (Doria, 2011) as 
somewhat of an unconditional good, but which (even on a theoretical level) is 
far from uncontroversial. As a matter of fact, Callon and Muniesa (2005) 
provide clarification of what is involved in the practice of “calculation”: 
 
First ... the entities taken into account have to be detached. A 
finite number of entities are moved, arranged and ordered in a 
single space. 
. . . . 
Once they have thus been sorted out, the entities considered ... 
are associated with one another and subjected to manipulations 
and transformations ... . 
. . . . 
A third step is necessary to obtain an accomplished calculation: 
a result has to be extracted. A new entity must be produced ... 
that corresponds precisely to the manipulations effected in the 
calculative space and, consequently, links ... the entities taken 
into account. This resulting entity ... has to be able to leave the 
calculative space and circulate elsewhere in an acceptable way 
... . (Callon & Muniesa, 2005, 1231) 
 
In light of this, it is difficult to see how – if by quality we mean “singularity” 
(Doria, 2009, 145) – it becomes at all possible not to lose it considering the 
very appraisal of “quality” requires a disembedding from the context in which 
“singularity” obtains, in order to arrive at something else that, while allowing 
comparison, has lost its original continuity with the surrounding environment, 
only to be rendered as “auditable quality” (Doria, 2009, 152). In the 
assumption that the quality of an embedded presence can be translated 
“unconditionally” (i.e. after its abstraction – and extraction – from an 
underlying socio-cultural texture) a specific policy stance can be seen lurking, 
in relation to the manipulability of the human (and other-than-human) world, 
which is quite far from being “neutral” or “indeterminate”, but actually very 
close the social engineering posture mentioned earlier, which hides an 
essentially managerialist, economically-driven outlook on the world. 
 
[AE] Although the previous point about quality discourse being inevitably 
linked to a “social engineering posture” (a hyperbolic term which – it is 
submitted – is used only to cast any policy-suggesting posture in a negative 
light) is clear, there is – however - a merit in attempting to find a common 
language that allows comparisons across relative regime goals and 
objectives. Without such comparisons, the possibility of contesting any “social 
engineering posture” quickly evaporates, as there can't be a room for critique 
if there is no identifiable or intelligible value that is affected by the object of 
critique (otherwise, how is the above argument a contestation to Doria's?). 
 
However, regardless of whether Doria's view implicitly privileges “economic” 
quality or not, it is still difficult to see how his proposal would qualify as a 
useful tool to overcome the problem of regime collisions. Even if one takes 
Doria's theory of quality at face value, the very idea of a theoretically neutral 
concept that facilitates communication among different functional systems is 
problematic, because it assumes it is possible to fine-tune conflicting 
rationalities present within society in a universally acceptable way. 
 
This fine-tuning is possible within a territorial space where interaction can be 
smoothed by the presence of certain conditions. Within units where functional 
specificity is not the defining element (e.g. the nation-state, a rural community 
or a household), the presence of common values and long-term goals is the 
prerequisite to resolve rationality conflicts without recurring to violence or 
other political means.7 In the functionally differentiated transnational space, 
the absence of these common values and goals is what forces managerial 
experts to strive for hegemony through the mainstreaming of their vocabulary, 
which would allow them to not have to choose between integration or 
separation (Koskenniemi, forthcoming, 18-20). Policy positions regarding 
specific fields of knowledge – if they are to be communicated – have to be 
sensitive to circumstantial changes in the social realities in which they are set 
to be applied, otherwise they risk political or violent rejection.8 To ignore this 
is nothing short of denying the social dimension of the different fields of 
knowledge. 
In societies where the functional criterion is not the dominant principle of 
societal differentiation (e.g. indigenous communities) and the success of a 
functional system over another has little political significance, collisions 
between functional systems are not problematic because the lack of 
separation between them makes the development of a lingua franca 
unnecessary. 
 
[LR] This last response and critique of Doria’s “quality calculation” as a tool to 
enable regime collisions by virtue of its (supposed) neutrality and (equidistant) 
in-betweenness vis-à-vis specialized sectorial rationalities appears not so 
concerned with Doria’s attempt to find a common language (which it seems to 
accept), but with the fact that such common language is presented as 
“neutral”, thereby hiding precise political aims. To some extent, it is possible 
                                            
7
 For instance, in several nation-states, it is likely that achieving high economic growth with low inflation and 
unemployment, while at the same time preserving good labor and environmental conditions could be fairly 
uncontroversial long-term goals; thereby making economic performance, social justice and environmental protection 
the values that determine political stability within their national borders. For a – perhaps naïf - attempt to locate 
common values even at the level of the international community, see Kwakwa (2003, 33 ff.) 
8
 Mainstream positions gain their mainstream place in society because they adapted to a certain social circumstance. 
For the mainstream to be challenged, there has to be a change in that social circumstance that justifies it. 
to sympathize with this and – indeed – Koskenniemi also appears to be alive 
to the danger inherent in the assumption of a “higher” vantage point from 
which problems may be neutrally solved (Koskenniemi, forthcoming, 4). 
Where the foregoing view still appears problematic, however, is the moment it 
assumes that – in relation to units where functional differentiation appears 
less pronounced – the different rationalities can be “fine-tuned” due to the 
existence of “common values and long-term goals”. This position, it is 
submitted,  fails to see the issue of collisions as it is present in the parts as 
well. Let me explain this a little bit further. 
 
John Law highlights different types of discourses about complex systems.9 
On the one hand, he spots the tendency – in a certain type of discourse about 
systems – to locate complex emergent behaviour only at the global level, 
somehow “essentializing” all other components as the simple cogs of a 
machine: 
 
[T]o grasp a reality which emerges out of interaction between 
its components ... it is necessary to treat those components as 
conformable in one way or another, similar in kind (Law, 2003, 
3). 
 
On the other hand, however, a feature of complexity is its being present not 
only at the global level, but also within the parts (Law, 2003, 8). All this to say 
that a “retreat” into what are presented as simpler realities that are located 
below the “functionally differentiated transnational space” (i.e. the locus of 
complex emergent behaviour that gives rise to regime collisions), and finding 
them as repositories of “common values” which enable to “fine-tune” regime 
collisions hides the plural nature of such realities under the cloak of political 
consensus. If one is to be serious about pluralism, the refusal to acknowledge 
the “other” using fictions of a unity that is not there is the very denial of 
pluralism. 
 
More importantly, the foregoing explanatory key for regime collisions also 
appears to put too much weight on politics. In this respect, it is not too far from 
Koskenniemi (forthcoming, 22) the moment he advocates the translation of 
clashes between specialized functional rationalities in political claims, so that 
every conflict is ultimately reduced to a political conflict. If every conflict is 
political, and if politics is based on power play, then why do we keep talking 
about conflicts despite the fact that one of the two sides to a regime collision 
may enjoy more currency than the other, i.e. one of the two sides is politically 
stronger? If power play were what defines and decides regime collisions, then 
we couldn't even articulate the concept of regime collisions, as these would 
be buried underneath the fist of the politically stronger side. 
                                            
9
 By  complex system, it is here meant the following:  
A system is a set of things—people, cells, molecules, or whatever—interconnected in such a way 
that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time. The system may be buffeted, 
constricted, triggered, or driven by outside forces. But the system’s response to these forces is 
characteristic of itself, and that response is seldom simple in the real world (Meadows, 2008, 2). 
 
My view, in other words, is that the assumption of all-contestability inherent in 
political discourse misses the point about regime collisions: two functional 
regimes collide because each regards itself and its prerogatives as non-
negotiable. We mustn't forget, after all, that specialized functional systems are 
characterized by a “one-track mind” whereby they act on the world based on 
their unidimensional understanding of it. This is why different regimes collide, 
and this is also why – it is submitted – what defines regime collisions is not 
politics, but rather the specific rationalities of the regimes involved, each of 
which does not see itself as being up for grabs in political power play. 
To go back to the main topic – pluralism within regime collisions – the idea 
that one ought to develop a common language is often misunderstood as one 
regime having to accept the tradeoffs of another; tradeoffs which might – 
however – discount the other regime's prerogatives in a trivial manner. Saying 
that the common language is to be imposed by political consensus is, 
however, hiding pluralism behind a fiction. “We're more than you are” is not an 
answer to the non-negotiable instances that make a collision a collision, and 
that characterise it as a collision between regimes (e.g. trade versus health or 
trade versus the environment), and not as an exercise in counting the 
reciprocal camps.10 For there to be a pluralist space within which to play out 
regime collisions, the different regimes involved must be able to “see” each 
other. In the language of Luhmann, the two systems must become selectively 
open to one another and try to grasp the non-negotiable instances of the 
other.11 This, of course, is not a static process. Instead, it involves a constant 
“turning of the table”, namely the reiterated challenge to the unilateral framing 
of the problem by one of the sides involved, along with the opening of parallel 
sites for contestation.12 
 
[AE] Three comments can be made on this. Firstly, functional regimes in the 
real world are not monolithic structures, as they have all been hybridized to 
some extent by historically contingent circumstances. The thought of a 
functional system as a pure structure is only an abstraction that is analytically 
useful for the purposes of this discussion. There is equal simplification of  the 
realities at play in the regime collision the moment one depicts specialized 
functional regimes as being “characterized by a one-track mind with a 
unidimensional understanding of the world.” However, what allows us to even 
speak about regime collisions is the fact that the degree of their hybridization 
still permits the identification of a predominant functional system, which 
several legal pluralists assume the moment they speak about one in 
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 This would be, in other words, a denial of the possibility to see “enemies” as “adversaries” (Schiff Berman, 2006-
07, 1192 quoting Mouffe, 2000, 13). 
11
 This is the meaning attached here to the “selective process of networking” which Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 
(2004, 1017) refer to. 
12
 Once again, this should be nothing new. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano (2004, 1018) already suggest how inter-
regime conflicts take place “in the absence of collectively binding decisions, centralized competences and 
hierarchically ordered legal principles”, these being replaced by “a sequence of decisions within a variety of 
observational positions in a network; a process in which network nodes mutually reconstruct, influence, limit, control, 
and provoke one another, but which never leads to one final collective decision on substantive norms.” 
particular.13 This does not deny that the identification of separate systems 
blurring into a hybrid is always tentative: perhaps, it is not possible to take a 
vantage point that will permit to grasp the identities (which may well be very 
complex systems in their own right) of the regimes that form a hybrid in their 
full variety, beyond a mono-cultural understanding of function, or even of the 
hybrid itself. In fact, the concept of functional regime – and the notion of 
hybridity that assumes clashes between different regimes - is biased in a way 
that prevents  different regimes from fully meeting one another, because 
functional regimes are unable to conceive of a perfect union between 
themselves and their environment, therefore the distinction between functional 
systems is bound to persist so long as we decide to use them as analytical 
tools. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos puts this clearly in his discussion of law as 
paradox:14 
 
Every observation is a distinction, and every distinction divides 
the marked from the unmarked. The unmarked always includes 
the observer … the observer cannot see the unity – he can only 
see what remains after the unity has been severed. What he 
sees may well be a unity, but it will not include himself. He 
remains in a blind spot, namely the point of observation that 
enables observation to take place. (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 
2005, 127) 
 
Secondly, the emphasis  on the political dimension of regime collisions has to 
do with their origin, which defines the natural boundaries of any 
communication between different functional systems. It appears difficult to see 
how a functional system can be acknowledged by (or “become selectively 
open to”) another if it doesn't make itself visible by appealing to values that 
are politically significant15 for the relevant stakeholders. From the vantage 
point of whom has been called “the social engineer” and whom I prefer to call 
“the policymaker” (who basically is the person that is trying to figure out what 
the hybrid structure should look like), there are two moments where an 
acknowledgement of the political is crucial: 
 
1. At the moment we decide whether there is a regime collision (e.g. can 
a functional regime keep its course of action without making any 
compromises and get what it seeks without diminishing it?). In 
deciding this, one is implicitly gauging whether one of the seemingly 
                                            
13
 Pierre Schlag (2009, 51), for example, warns against overstating the power of de-reifying processes - which in 
this context we call hybridizing processes - since the differentiation of certain functional systems (like law and the 
social) are “ideationally perspicuous as well as socially real and effective”. 
14 It follows from the above that the categories of functional systems and hybrids are, in this paper, better 
understood as heuristic tools to unveil the cycle of reification and de-reification which follows from the 
acknowledgment of selective opening, even from the – perhaps conservative – premise of operative closure. In other 
words, our interest in hybrids is more as an inroad to the understanding of a process than as an entity in 
themselves. There are, of course, alternative ways of conceptualizing hybridization beyond the “hybrid” Schlag-
Teubner framework that is being used further on in this paper, though a full discussion probably falls outside of the 
more limited, process focus of this paper. 
15
 In this context the “political” is understood to be the constellation of social concerns that enables a given 
tradeoff to be initially attractive and meaningful, and eventually stable in a given timescale and society. 
colliding functional regimes is worthy of attention, which has a lot to 
do with our values and what we perceive to be the values of the 
stakeholder community. The outcome of this judgment call can be the 
start of the process of hybridization
16
 or the annihilation of the weaker 
regime.
17
 
 
2. At the moment of bargaining between functional regimes. Here is 
where we apply the “grasping of the non-negotiable instances of the 
other” that was talked about, by placing special attention on the 
possible overlaps and compatibilities that might exist. If there are no 
overlaps, an acknowledgement of the degree to which one has the 
upper (or lower) hand will make the non-negotiables negotiable. A 
refusal to acknowledge might translate into the above-mentioned 
annihilation. 
 
After this moment, our initial forecast of the functional synthesis will meet 
reality and its capacity to be politically stable will be put to the test, but until 
then this is the best we can do unless one believes there is a way to factor in 
the unknowable. 
 
Thirdly, it has been attempted to highlight the levels (e.g. globe, nation-state, 
rural community) at which common values and long-term goals are identified 
because they determine the spectrum of stakeholders that must be taken into 
account. If one were to take the claim that a high degree of complexity exists 
even at smaller scales seriously, then one should also accept that the sum of 
the smaller highly-complex social units will be increasingly more difficult to 
fine-tune as the common values become harder to specify. 
 
[LR] Some of the above points are rather meaningful. Indeed, the last answer 
can be a good inroad into the exploration of areas of convergence. First of all, 
in relation to the role of the political in regime collisions: whereas – from the 
perspective of Luhmann's sociological theory of society – power is 
concentrated in the political system, so that it is (by definition) absent 
whenever two systems other than politics collide,18 other scholars like 
Thornhill (2007) have objected to the conflation of the medium of power into 
the political system, and see a more ubiquitous role for power even in regime 
collisions: 
 
Modern politics ... obtains its intensity in those exceptional 
instances where the intricately and plurally differentiated fabrics 
connecting society's systems begin to simplify themselves, and, 
                                            
16
 Which is what Poul Kjaer (2010, 522 citing Luhmann, 1997, 153) calls “the functional synthesis” when discussing 
the interaction of the political and legal systems. 
17
 Which, however, is clearly not an instance of pluralistic interaction (Schiff Berman, 2006-07, 1237). 
18
 “[Luhmann] insisted ... that no system of society can assume measurable priority over any other system, and, 
consequently, that politics cannot impute to itself responsibility for regulating areas of society which are not internal 
to its relatively narrow communications” (Thornhill, 2007, 503). 
specifically, where one system begins to produce 
communications which are not reconcilable with the pluralistic 
format of society as a whole and reduce the freedoms 
constitutive of society's modern form. (Thornhill, 2007, 515) 
 
In light of this, it appears that what has been suggested in the last response is 
substantially coincident with the representation of regime collisions as 
instances where “structural knots, or cases of concentrated over-layering” 
(Thornhill, 2007, 510) occur, namely instances of clash between the 
rationalities of different societal systems, to which political power play also 
comes to be attached. 
 
The pronounced hybridity disclosed by this kind of scenarios of overlapping 
rationalities, then, leads to a second point, which has already been introduced 
in the last response by mentioning Schlag's work on de-differentiation 
(Schlag, 2009). In fact, talking about regime collisions takes us through 
various stages of and oscillations between reification and de-reification 
(Schlag, 2009, 51). So, for instance, it becomes necessary – in order to define 
regime collisions – to postulate stable identities for the conflicting regimes. 
And yet, as the systems become visible in each other's world and selectively 
open to perturbation, “not only might we expect the relations of [the conflicting 
regimes] to change but their identities as well” (Schlag, 2009, 43). Given two 
systems A and B – Schlag continues: 
 
If the relations between A and B are dynamic, interactive, and 
dialectical, then we have no reason to suppose that A and B will 
retain any sort of conceptual or ontological integrity. On the 
contrary, we would expect all sorts of stuff to happen. Maybe A 
would be transformed into A1 A2 or A105. Some regions or 
moments of A might fade into B. In turn, B might become more 
A-like. We would get some hybrids—some AB-things happening, 
some B within A within B within A things. And so on and so 
forth. We would get a lot of differentiation as well as a lot of 
entropy. The system is dynamic and being dynamic, the 
identities at stake (originally A and B) combine and change in a 
variety of ways. At some point, we would begin to think that A 
and B ... have become inextricably intertwined in multiple ways. 
At the very least, we would lose any confidence in our ability to 
deploy an A/B distinction. (Schlag, 2009, 43) 
 
While, as it has been correctly said in the last response, the above need not 
happen as a matter of necessity, Schlag's discussion of de-differentiation 
inevitably reminds us that – once we open spaces of contestation as a way to 
mediate regime collisions – the consequent hybridization might take us full 
circle to see the reification of the “functional systems” we started to begin with 
(e.g. economics, or law, or education, and so on). This, in turn, can lead us to 
see how stable identities are probably not the rule, but the exception, with 
hybrid spaces being the norm (Schiff Berman, 2006-07, 1234). Secondly, 
even if we acknowledge a certain degree of stability in the differentiations 
between functional systems, this does not tell us how these might be affected 
by hybridization; to use Schlag's words: “the mere presence of a socially 
extant and effective differentiation says nothing about its durability, 
porousness, or lack thereof” (Schlag, 2009, 51). 
This, then, is where there appears to be agreement between both the authors 
of this work, namely in the acknowledgment that the hybrid spaces that are 
generated at the overlap of different “regimes” ultimately lead one to question 
the solidity of the very regimes the identity of which was uncontroversially 
assumed to begin with. 
 
Where, instead, there is still room for disagreement – but this is not essential 
to being at one on the peculiar self-consciousness that regime collisions bring 
to bear on “essentialised” social differentiations – is in the willingness to 
relinquish a strictly analytical, cause-effect approach to understanding regime 
collision in favour of a systems thinking perspective.19 My personal inquiry 
into regime collisions, in fact, is probably shaped by an awareness that: 
 
To ask whether elements, interconnections, or purposes are 
most important in a system is to ask an unsystemic question. All 
are essential. All interact. All have their roles. But the least 
obvious part of the system, its function or purpose, is often the 
most crucial determinant of the system’s behavior. 
Interconnections are also critically important. Changing 
relationships usually changes system behavior. The elements, 
the parts of systems we are most likely to notice, are often (not 
always) least important in defining the unique characteristics of 
the system—unless changing an element also results in 
changing relationships or purpose. (Meadows, 2009, 17) 
 
For this reason, it's not questions of agency – political, social or otherwise – in 
the context of regime collisions which this author finds meaningful or 
illuminating, being rather more curious to look at the (communicative) 
dynamics of the generation of hybridity over time.20 This, in turn, requires a 
shift from analysis and (to go back to Doria's paper) calculation (both of which 
postulate a disembedding, an isolation of the elements deemed relevant for 
decision-making) to the experiential (Schlag, 2009, 37) and the 
participative,21 that might be more conducive to an “embedded” analysis of 
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 On the difference between the two, see Meadows (2009, 3). 
20
 Lange (1998) has attempted to show how “[a]gency is considered more problematic to achieve [in systems-
theoretic as opposed to action-based approaches] and thus structures become a precondition for agency” (Lange, 
1998, 459), rather than agency and structure being two terms that somehow exclude each other, so that “[a]n 
increase in social structures leads to a decrease in human agency” (Lange, 1998, 458). Moreover, Lange also shows 
that, even though systems-theoretic approaches retain notions of agency (Lange 1998, 458-61), they also 
problematize the possibility of “intervention” in a social system, which “has to take into account the system’s own 
rationality, its codes and the nature of its self-referential processes” (Lange, 1998, 462).  
21
 Participation - as opposed to analysis - is, indeed, the catchword of the systems approach to relating with the 
environment, which is close - for instance - to the outlook of deep ecology. See Harding (2009, 39) 
hybridization processes and regime collisions;22 however, this last point has 
rather more to do with personal methodological choice and topical focus than 
with the substantive issue of hybrids in regime collisions. 
 
[AE] Indeed, the point of  divergence of the opinions expressed so far has 
become clearer. On my part, there has been an attempt to engage with the 
problem of regime collisions so as to find an analytically rich way to tackle 
them with a view to getting a politically stable solution, which varies 
depending on the social context where they take place. In doing this, it hasn’t 
been an aim to develop a theory that is receptive to all the feedbacks (past, 
present and future) that concern a particular collision; rather, a choice has 
been made to be selective with the feedbacks to be considered relevant to 
take a decision or simply to pass judgment on the proposed solutions. The 
tasks of policy-making and decision-making23 require some degree of static 
abstraction because of the natural limitations the human mind has. The less 
abstract the analytical approach is, the harder it becomes to make a 
decision.24 
 
The disembedding and separation (in the abstract) of each contending 
functional system is necessary for analytical purposes. The complete and 
partial differentiations of functional systems enable analysis, but their total de-
differentiation kills it. An “embedded” analysis is – it is respectfully submitted - 
hardly an analysis, and if one wants to engage in it then this only means the 
nature of one’s interest in regime collisions is different from that of this author. 
Conversely, of course, this means that by choosing the former standpoint one 
is also beyond criticism for not performing something which he/she did not set 
him/herself to do in the first place. 
 
Doria's theory about quality has been tackled, on my part,  from an analytical 
perspective to evaluate whether it can shed some light on functional 
collisions; in other words, whether it can facilitate the conception of a 
politically stable hybrid. The other responses,  on another hand, evaluated its 
ability to cast an image of an embedded social reality where functional 
systems would be hard to recognize, thus de-problematizing the functional 
collision. On the one hand, there was an attempt to see the pathway to a 
hybrid, on the other to see the wholeness that doesn't require hybridizing 
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 As one of the characters of The Man from Earth would describe it: “We have two simple choices: we can all get 
bent out of shape intellectualizing or bench-pressing logic or we can simply relax and enjoy it. I can listen, critically, 
but clearly I don't have to make up my mind about anything.” (‘The Man from Earth’, 2007). 
23
 Which in the context of legislation/adjudication are separated by a very tenuous line (Kennedy, 1997, 97-127). 
24
 Calabresi (1982, 56) illustrates this point very well in his discussion on whether administrative agencies or courts 
should be in charge of updating laws, which would apply perfectly to the managerialist problem-solving that interests 
this debate: “The point, then, is not whether institutions unconstrained by principle can properly update laws; 
obviously legislatures can, if they but will. Nor is it whether only legislatures can be permitted to do the job; we have 
traditionally employed juries to do it as well. It is, rather, whether administrative agencies are sufficiently responsive 
to the electorate so that we can trust their sense of what preferences and distinctions are appropriate, to serve at 
least as the starting point for legislative reaction.” 
because it was never separate.25 In sum, it has been attempted on my part to 
provide an account – which has above been criticized as simplistic - for the 
always partial reification or de-reification of functional systems in real life (as 
mediated by the political component in regime collisions). 
 
However, there appears to be a clear convergence in the refusal to believe in  
a managerial pseudo-neutral analytical tool to define the boundaries of each 
functional system, and in the acknowledgement that their core and periphery 
are hard to pin down. There is also an acknowledgment of the changing 
composition of the hybrids throughout and after the collision between the 
identities that integrate them. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have endeavoured to provide a pluralistic account of 
pluralism in the context of regime collisions, understood as conflicts between 
different rationalities (such as the economy, law, politics, education and so 
forth). After a brief introduction to the idea of a regime collision in the 
transnational level, we have engaged in a debate which set off from a 
discussion of “quality” calculation as a (managerialist) tool to facilitate regime 
collisions. Both authors rejected quality calculation as an approach to regime 
collisions that be fit to enable insights into the latter's inner workings and 
internal dynamics, either because of its assumption of quality as a neutral 
medium that hides the ubiquity of political (hence non-value-neutral) 
contestation at collision sites, or – alternatively – because of its analytical 
approach to regime collisions that, by “mobilising” through isolation a set of 
relevant elements, prevents a participative, embedded appreciation of system 
dynamics. 
 
What did emerge from the debate was, instead, a common willingness to 
acknowledge plurality, not just in an abstract, static sense that assumes the 
lasting endurance of original identities and positions, but as a fundamental 
challenge to the very starting points, which recover their ambivalence as the 
departure towards an end, as well as a parting from a given perspective. 
Indeed, as conflicting regimes become visible to one another and generate 
common spaces for contestation, this enables in turn a movement, an 
oscillation within and without the perspective embodied by a particular 
functional rationality, which in turn promotes a particular self-consciousness in 
the use of otherwise uncontroversial differentiations (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2010, 26-7). What pluralism seems to enable, therefore, is a 
repeated marking of ever-shifting distinctions, as well as a crossing to the 
other side of any such distinction (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, 38-
40),26 through which a fleeting glimpse of a de-differentiated totality can be 
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 To use Duncan Kennedy’s terminology, my responder could be seen as an “irrationalist organicist” that engages 
in a “dialectical transformation” narrative whereas this author is more of a “rationalist antinomian” with a 
“decisionist” narrative (Kennedy, 2001, 1155-58 & 1162-63). 
26
 This we see to be substantially similar to Schlag's idea of the constant swinging between reification and de-
reification (Schlag, 2009, 51). 
experienced. 
 
In other words, the peculiar self-consciousness that a pluralistic approach to 
regime collisions brings about prevents one from “[g]azing into the future in a 
problem-solving mode” (Koskenniemi, forthcoming, 22), which would prevent 
“asking the question about how it is that we are ruled by these languages, 
these men and women” (Koskenniemi, forthcoming, 22). The constant 
(critical) oscillation between perspectives that regime collisions enable 
prevents allegiance to a static formulation of issues and problems. Instead, as 
regime boundaries are challenged by “hybrids” and functional identities 
become more contested and entropic, so do the practices of 
“problematization”, that keep changing along with regime boundaries and 
identities. 
 
As a matter of fact, this has been very much our experience in the debate 
presented in this paper. In arriving at a satisfactory formulation of pluralism by 
using a pluralistic method based on a shared space of debate and 
contestation, we have witnessed a repeated turning of the table, a reciprocal 
challenge to the other's framing of issues, which – in turn – promoted greater 
self-consciousness and, ultimately, a shift (and a convergence) in the 
designation of problems: from a debate on the role of the political in regime 
collisions, our discussion shifted to the critical reflection on the dynamic 
effects that regime collisions exert on the very self-identities of conflicting 
regimes, and on the reversal of the rule-to-exception relationship between 
regimes and collisions among regimes.27 The commitment to critical 
revisitation of positions over time in light of ongoing hybridization at the edges 
is, in the end, what we can say connects both of us to the project of a pluralist, 
colourful left; one that is both joyous and melancholic, undefined yet emergent 
from entropic interplay; a left that savours the rich texture of mutual 
paradoxification in the folds of constant oscillation. 
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 Indeed, as regime boundaries become less clear-cut (or, at the very least, less identical to themselves over time) 
through repeated revisitation as they set themselves in a dynamic relationship with a colliding regime, hybridity 
eventually seems more ubiquitous than “purist” differentiations appear to be. 
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